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Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective
on the Power of Technical Knowledge
in Fiscal Law and Policy*
Lisa Philipps
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University
Abstract - Decisions about taxation and government spending have great
political significance: they affect the distribution of income and wealth and the
nature and degree of class, gender and other social inequalities. However, tax
and budgetary issues are frequently constructed as technical matters that can be
resolved rationally according to economic, mathematical or other ostensibly
neutral principles. The author examines the debate around budget deficits and
recent sex equality challenges to the income tax system, and argues that both
illustrate how technical discourses tend to deny the normative content of fiscal
law and policy and to disqualify political opposition to the prevailing fiscal
order as irrational, ideological and inexpert. The paper concludes by examining
the discursive strategies offeminists and others interested in fiscal change. The
author considers how feminists might respond to, and even harness, the power of
technical knowledges in struggling for tax and expenditure reforms while also
challenging the oppressive features and depoliticizing tendencies of such
discourses.
Risumi - Les mesures fiscales et les dicisions relatives aux depenses
publiques revitent une grande importance : elles touchent la distribution du
revenu et des richesses ainsi que la nature et l'tendue des inigalitds d'ordre
social. Toutefois, les questions d'ordres fiscal et budgdtaire sont le plus souvent
traitdes comme des questions techniques qui commandent des solutions
rationnelles reposant sur des principes economiques, mathimatiques ou, du
mains, en apparence neutres. Dans le prisent article, l'auteure fait itat du ddbat
sur la question du deficit budgitaire et des ricentes tentatives visant ez dinoncer
les inigalitis de sexe existant dans le syst~me fiscal; selon elle, cette polimique
illustre lafafon dont le jargon technique tend ei masquer le contenu normatif de
la politique et de la loi fiscales et 6i contrer toute forme d'opposition 6i l'ordre
I wish to acknowledge the helpful feedback I received on earlier versions of this
paper from Neil Brooks, Judith Grbich, Marlee Kline, Greg Levine, Martha Minow,
Nancy Staudt, Kathy Teghtsoonian, Mark de Weerdt, Margot Young, participants
in the Critical Tax Theory Workshop held at SUNY-Buffalo School of Law in
September 1995, and journal referees.
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fiscal itabli en la taxant d'irrationnelle, idjologique et simpliste. L'auteure
conclut en faisant l'itude des strategies discursives des groupes fiministes et
d'autres groupes visant le changement de la politiquefiscale. Elle y suggkre des
mithodes permettant auxfiministes de contrer a leur tour, sinon de neutraliser,
le pouvoir du savoir technique afin d'obtenir les rdformesfiscales et budgitaires
voulues et remettre en question l'arbitraire et la tendance a la dipolitisation
d'un tel jargon.
This paper draws connections between two issues that initially may seem rather
far apart. The first is the country's political preoccupation with reducing
government deficits and debt.1 The second is the Supreme Court of Canada's
rejection of two feminist challenges to the Income Tax Act, 2 in the cases of
Symes v. Canada3 (regarding the deductibility of child care expenses from
business income) and Thibaudeau v. Canada4 (on the taxation of child support
payments). What does this recent jurisprudence have in common with the debate
over budgetary deficits? Both are certainly within the realm of fiscal policy,
having to do with taxes and government expenditures. 5 But more importantly, I
argue, both demonstrate the power of technical discourses in shaping the fiscal
order and in reproducing social and economic inequalities.
No great powers of observation are needed to notice that both tax law and
fiscal policy formation are dominated by a relatively small and elite group of
experts. Nor would many dispute the inaccessibility of the technical language in
which these issues are often discussed. In this paper, I focus on the way these
technical discourses tend to deny the normative content of tax law and policy,
and thus to deflect political challenges to the prevailing fiscal order. In this
manner, technical discourses work to protect the interests of the relatively
wealthy and powerful, and to sustain and legitimate the economic
marginalization of women and other subordinated groups.
In the sections which follow, I develop this argument in three stages. The
first looks at some historical and cultural reasons that help explain why technical
knowledge has so much clout in the fiscal area, and sets out a framework for
1. In this paper, i use the terms "deficit" and "debt" interchangeably. For clarity,
however, it should be noted that a deficit is a shortfall of government revenues in
relation to expenditures for any given year. Debt refers to the accumulated stock of
outstanding debts owed by a government as a result of financing previous years'
budget deficits.
2. R.S.C. 1985, (5th Suppl.), c. 1, as am. [hereinafter ITA].
3. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [hereinafter Symes].
4. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 [hereinafter Thibaudeau].
5. The term "fiscal policy" refers to the "[e]xpenditure and taxation policies that
underlie a government's budget." See J. McMenemy, The Language of Canadian
Politics, rev. ed. (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995).
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analyzing the gendered politics of this phenomenon. In the second part, I look at
the debate around budget deficits and how technical discourses advance certain
political values in this debate while simultaneously asserting their own neutrality
and objectivity and disqualifying oppositional discourses as sentimental and
irrational. The third part considers how feminists and others committed to
political change might engage with the technical in challenging the tax system
and the larger fiscal order. The Supreme Court of Canada's rulings in Symes and
Thibaudeau serve to highlight the ideological power of the tax system's claim to
neutrality and the difficulty feminists face in trying either to deconstruct or to
transform the technical discourses that support this claim. In Thibaudeau
particularly, the Court privileges the language and concepts of fiscal policy so as
to place them virtually beyond the reach of equality rights discourse. In this final
part, I consider what discursive strategies might help to advance feminist
political aims in the fiscal area, and the possibilities and dangers that lie in
appropriating technical discourses to our own uses.
The Politics of Technical Talk: Normalizing Inequality
There are many ways in which the current fiscal regime contributes to social
inequality. The very existence of something called "state fiscal policy" says a
great deal about the sanctity of private property in our society. It presupposes a
separation of public and private realms in which the tax system limits how far
the state, in pursuit of collective goals, can legitimately encroach upon the
property rights of individuals. 6 Inequalities associated with the market are
implicitly conceived as natural, and susceptible only to limited correction by
governments. Moreover, the tax system is often assumed to be more
redistributive than it actually is. 7
The personal income tax is in principle based on ability to pay, reflected in
the nominally progressive marginal rate schedule,8 but its actual progressivity is
diminished by several factors. First among these is the wide variety of special
concessions in the form of deductions, credits, deferrals and exclusions from
6. See J. Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State", trans. W. F. Stolper &
R. A. Musgrave, in A. T. Peacock, W. F. Stolpar, R. Turvey & E. Henderson, eds.,
International Economic Papers, no.4 (London & New York: Macmillan,1954) 5.
7. For a thorough and engaging analysis of the regressive elements of the tax system
and how they have been exacerbated by tax policy changes since 1988, see
N. Brooks, "The Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accomodating
the Rich" [1993] 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 137. See also L. Panitch, "Beyond the
Crisis of the Tax State? From Fair Taxation to Structural Reform" in
A. M. Maslove, ed., Fairness in Taxation: Exploring the Principles (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993) 135.
8. ITA, s.117(2).
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income, that disproportionately benefit those with higher incomes. 9 These so-
called tax expenditures reduce the effective rates applicable to some taxpayers,
providing them with a financial subsidy just as though they had received a direct
payment from the government. 10 Second, the personal income tax is only one
component of the total tax mix. A large share of government revenue is obtained
through other taxes, many of which have a regressive incidence, such as sales
taxes imposed at flat rates regardless of income level."I The fact that Canada
does not impose personal wealth taxes, which generally are strongly progressive,
is also significant in this regard. 12 Finally, courts have tended to favour
interpretations of tax law which place a high value on the individual or corporate
person's liberty to avoid taxes. 13 In practice, sophisticated avoidance planning is
9. For a study of the incidence of personal tax expenditures by income bracket, see
F. St. Hilaire, For Whom the Tax Breaks, vol. 2, no 2 (Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1996). A list of tax expenditures and their cost in foregone revenue
is available in Government of Canada, Personal and Corporate Income Tax
Expenditures (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1993). See also N. Brooks, Paying
for Civilized Society: The Need for Fair and Responsible Tax Reform (Ottawa:
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1990); J. B. Davies, "Distributional Effects of the
Lifetime Capital Gains Exemption: Single vs. Multi-Year Analysis" (1995)
Canadian Public Policy (XXI Supplement) S159; K. Lahey, "The Small Business
Credit: A Tax Expenditure Analysis" (1979) 1 Canadian Taxation 29.
10. See E. A. Lindquist, "Improving the Scrutiny of Tax Expenditures in Ontario:
Comparative Perspectives and Recommendations" in A. M. Maslove, ed., Taxing
and Spending: Issues of Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 32;
N. Bruce, ed., Tax Expenditures and Government Policy (Kingston, Ont.: John
Deutch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 1988).
11. See N. Brooks, supra note 7; Royal Commission on Taxation, The Incidence of
Taxes and Public Expenditures in the Canadian Economy, Study No. 2 by
W. I. Gillespie, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); W. 1. Gillespie, The
Redistribution of Income in Canada (Ottawa: Institute of Canadian Studies,
Carleton University, 1980).
12. See M. Maloney, "Distributive Justice: That is the Wealth Tax Issue" (1988)
Ottawa Law Review 601; L. Philipps, Taxing Inherited Wealth: Ideologies About
Property and the Family in Canada (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1992) at 38-
70; Wealth Tax Working Group Report (Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1993).
13. Tax statutes traditionally were subject to a strict construction rule in Canada. In
recent years, the courts have ostensibly modified this rule to take into account the
object and spirit of the legislation: see Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 536. However, in practice, the courts have continued to prefer
interpretations that leave ample leeway for tax avoidance: see, for example, Johns -
Manville Canada Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 46; McClurg v. The Queen,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1020; The Queen v. Irving Oil Limited (1991), 126 N.R. 47
(F.C.A.) [leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied]; Antosko v. The Queen, [1994] 2 S.C.R.
312; Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours v. Communauti urbaine de Quibec
and City of Quibec, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, at 19, where the Court quoted approvingly
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available almost exclusively to those who own substantial amounts of business
or investment property.
I do not wish to suggest that the fiscal system is monolithically oppressive,
or to deny that political struggle has resulted in some meaningful redistributive
reforms. 14 The point is there are also many ways in which tax law sustains and
deepens patterns of social inequality. It should also be noted that the benefits and
burdens of taxation are distributed unequally not only in terms of class, but
along lines of gender, sexual orientation, and other markers of social
difference. 15
In this paper, I want to approach the relationship between budgetary policy
and inequality from a somewhat different angle. I argue that the political
dynamics just noted are complemented by the technical discourses of fiscal law
and policy. Such discourses tend to reinforce the patterns of inequality
mentioned above, while simultaneously serving the equally important function
of legitimating and normalizing them. They achieve this by framing what are
essentially political issues as purely technical questions susceptible of neutral
solutions. To borrow Carol Smart's words, they give the discourse a claim to
"scientificity," conferring upon it a privileged status as objective, apolitical
truth, and disqualifying other knowledges which might challenge the fiscal
order. 16 The next section focuses on tax law to illustrate this discursive effect.
from its judgment in Johns-Manville Canada (ibid.), as follows: "reasonable
uncertainty or factual ambiguity resulting from lack of explicitness in the statute
should be resolved in favour of the taxpayer." On the ability of advantaged groups
to influence the bureaucratic administration of the tax system, see L. Sossin,
"Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry into Authority, Discretion and the
Possibility of Engagement in the Welfare State" (1994) 26 Ottawa Law Review 1.
14. See, for example, R. Krever, "The Origin of Federal Income Taxation in Canada"
(1981) 3 Canadian Taxation 170, on the struggle to introduce progressive income
taxation in the early part of this century.
15. See, for example, A. Macklin, "Symes v. MNR: Where Sex Meets Class" (1992)
C.J.W.L. 498; M. Maloney, "Women and the Income Tax Act: Marriage,
Motherhood and Divorce" (1989) C.J.W.L. 182; L. Philipps, "Tax Policy and The
Gendered Distribution of Wealth" in I. Bakker, ed., Rethinking Restructuring:
Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto
Press, 1996) 141 [hereinafter "Tax Policy"]; L. Philipps & M. Young, "Sex, Tax
and the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau v. The Queen" (1995) 2 Review of
Constitutional Studies 221; C. Young, "(ln)visible Inequalities: Women, Tax and
Poverty" (1995) 27 Ottawa Law Review 99; C. Young, "Taxing Times for
Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What Cost?" (1994) 17 Dalhousie L.J. 534.
See also Women and Taxation Working Group Report (Ontario Fair Tax
Commission, 1993).
16. C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at 9
[drawing on Foucault].
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The Technical in Tax Law
What is a technical discourse? The term has several layers of meaning, as it is
used in this paper. Tax law is technical in the dictionary sense that it is a
specialized field of knowledge, with its own language, involving a terminology
and grammatical style that is not readily accessible to persons without
specialized training. This inaccessibility is not merely a function of complexity
or excessive detail. Indeed, bits of jargon and special terms can be used to
bestow authority on even the most superficial or oversimplified analyses. 17
In addition, tax law is affiliated with certain other discourses that are
technical in the same sense of being specialized fields of knowledge: economics,
accounting, public finance theory, traditional tax policy analysis. Aspects of
these discourses have been imported into, and internalized within tax law,
though judges in tax cases are quick to assert that such external knowledges
always remain subject to any overriding legal principles. 18 I think this is an
example of the phenomenon observed by Smart, in which law "sets itself
above"' 19 other, non legal discourses, while simultaneously incorporating
selected aspects of those discourses for its own purposes. 20 Smart argues that
this allows law to extend its reach and maintain its power in modern society by
allying itself with those knowledges that are important to what Foucault has
termed the "disciplining of the social body." 2'
There is a further dimension to the term "technical," one which goes
beyond mere specialized knowledge. It also implies a form of knowledge which
is scientific in nature, and this claim to scientificity is central to the power of
technical discourses. The relationship between the technical and the scientific is
not as straightforward as it first appears. Certainly, both are concerned with
method and systematicity. But the strong association of these terms is primarily
due to the fact that both refer in somewhat different ways to superior forms of
knowledge; the former quite explicitly in terms of expertise, the latter more
17. Thanks to Neil Brooks for this point.
18. See B. Arnold, Timing and the Taxation of Income: The Principles of Income
Measurement for Tax Purposes, Canadian Tax Paper No. 71 (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1983) c. 1, on the relationship between accounting and legal
principles in the determination of profit for tax purposes. See also Friesen v.
Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103, where the Court referred to accounting principles to
assist in determining whether the taxpayer's land qualified as "inventory" for the
purposes of s. 10(1) of the ITA. Both the majority and dissenting judges accepted
that express language in the ITA overrides accounting principles where the two are
in conflict. However, they disagreed on whether there was such an inconsistency in
the case at bar (per Major J. at 123, 124; and Iacobucci J. at 170, 171).
19. Supra note 16 at 10.
20. Ibid at 14-20.
21. Ibid at 17.
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obliquely through the claim to objectivity and pure truth. The construction of the
technical discourses in and around tax law as scientific feeds into a powerful
ideology in our culture about the nature of truth and knowledge.
Science and Truth
The glorification of empirical and scientific knowledge in Western cultures can
be traced back to the Enlightenment period of the 16th and 17th centuries, and
what Susan Bordo has so aptly termed "the flight to objectivity. ' 22 Bordo
describes the reconstruction of philosophical and epistemological paradigms that
occurred during this period as involving a radical separation of human intellect
from the body and physical nature. The organic universe of the Middle Ages was
thus shattered, and nature revisioned as a mechanistic force to be brought under
control by a superior human intelligence and will. The human body, its senses
and appetites, were constructed in total opposition to reason, and as the chief
impediment to knowledge and truth. The purest, most reliable knowledge
became that which was free of any perspective derived from bodily location in
time and space. The legacy of this reconstruction has been a model of scientific
inquiry in which the subject and object, the knower and the known are required
and assumed to be radically separate.
Bordo and others have illuminated the deeply gendered nature of this
paradigm of knowing and being. The physical universe abandoned as inferior in
the 17th century was distinctly female. In the cultural ideology that grew out of
the Enlightenment, the association of women with the physical, bodily
dimensions of life served to facilitate and normalize their social and political
subordination. 23 As Lorraine Code has put it:
[T]he ideals of rationality and objectivity that have guided and inspired
theorists of knowledge throughout the history of western philosophy have
been constructed through processes of excluding the attributes and
experiences commonly associated with femaleness and underclass social
status: emotion, connection, practicality, sensitivity, and idiosyncrasy. 24
22. See S. Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).
23. Ibid. at c. 6; see also S. Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture,
and the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
24. L. Code, "Taking Subjectivity into Account" in L. Alcoff & E. Potter, eds.,
Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993) 15 at 21. Like Code, Bordo
recognizes that the association of gender with different ways of knowing preceded
the Enlightenment and has much earlier roots. However, Bordo argues that the
work of Descartes represented a quantum shift towards the total opposition of mind
and body, and a more thorough subordination of the female.
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Bordo identifies several layers to this masculinization of science and
rationality. 25 She discusses the history of discrimination by a scientific
establishment that has doubted whether women practitioners can measure up to
the rigour or clarity science demands. In addition, scientific doctrine itself can be
biased by assumptions or inferences that are sexist, homophobic, racist, etc. And
finally, scientific method is dominated by a particular cognitive style or
epistemological stance, necessary for research to be accepted as authoritative.
The post-Enlightenment faith in rationality as the means to truth extends
far beyond scientific practice per se. It pervades the organisation of social
relations at many levels. Theorists of many disciplinary and political stripes have
seen this as a key feature of the way power is exercised in modern western
cultures. Writings about the rise of "technocracy," "technopoly," the "techno-
corporate state," the "technological society," and Foucault's "disciplinary
society'," while they encompass a wide range of perspectives, also share some
common themes in their description of modern social arrangements. 26 These
include:
(i) the polarization of the work process and society into expert and non-
expert sectors, along lines of class, race and sex;
ii) the increasing power of scientific knowledge and technical expertise as
the only, or the most legitimate bases of authority;
iii) the subordination/disqualification of other knowledges or languages; and
iv) the belief that technical knowledge holds the answer to all social
problems, and displaces traditional interest-group politics and moral
judgment.
Within this cultural context, quantification has become a central means of
understanding and describing the world. Ellul is critical of the scientific attitude
for paying heed only to that which can be expressed numerically. He comments
ironically that, "[t]o get away from the so-called 'arbitrary and subjective,' to
escape ethical or literary judgments (which, as everyone knows, are trivial and
unfounded), the scientist must get back to numbers. What, after all, can one hope
25. Supra note 22 at 104.
26. See B. H. Burris, "Technocratic Organization and Gender" (1989) Women's
Studies International Forum 447; B. H. Bums, Technocracy at Work (Albany:
State University of New York, 1993) [hereinafter Technocracy at Work]; J. Ellul,
The Technological Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); K. Ferguson, The
Feminist Case Against Bureaucrasy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1984); F. Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA:
Sage Publications, 1990); M. Foucault, "Power/Knowledge" in Colin Gordon, ed.,
Power/Knowledg: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977/Michel
Foucault (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) esp. at 131; U. Franklin, The Real
World of Technology (Concord, Ont.: Anansi, 1990); N. Postman, Technopoly: The
Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
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to deduce from the purely qualitative statement that the the worker is
fatigued?" 
27
Likewise, Postman decries our "mathematical concept of reality," in which
only quantitative measures are seen as authentic expressions of knowledge.
28
This poses a political problem for those who wish to challenge oppression and
its harmful effects on human beings. When juxtaposed with scientific
understandings of society, narratives about the quality of human experience may
be discounted as belonging to another mentality, one that is primitive, irrational,
custom-based, mythical, ideological, and biased.
29
Postman stresses the importance of what he calls technical machinery in
advancing the quantitative version of reality. Standard forms, taxonomies, public
opinion polls, and other tools operate by translating multifaceted, complex
realities into technical, precise and unidimensional terms which then become the
truth for us. He ascribes a similar function to statistics in their reduction of
human qualities to quantities. Our enchantment with the apparent objectivity of
these numbers tends to obscure the subjectivity of choices about what should be
the subject of measurement, and what goals technical means should strive
towards. 30
I do not wish to suggest that these technocratic tendencies are unrelievedly
negative. Many social theorists have emphasized the power of objective,
scientific knowledge to challenge established structures of authority and belief,
arguing that the rise of technical discourse signals a movement towards a more
democratic order based on reason and merit.3 1 Whether or not one is prepared to
concede the existence of any objective truth that can be revealed through
science, the discursive power of scientific argument can be of great value to
feminists and others who seek to delegitimate those conventional wisdoms that
contribute to oppression. As I discuss in the next section, however, technical
discourses can also have profoundly undemocratic and socially regressive
effects. This tension between the democratic and hegemonic capacities of
technical knowledge raises difficult political and strategic questions for
advocates of social change. It is ironic, however, that both the democratic and
hegemonic perspectives recognize an important element of duplicity in technical
discourse, that is its ability to advance a particular politics in part by denying
that it is doing so. Scientific and technocratic discourses rest upon an ideology of
value-neutrality or an ideology of non-ideology.
27. Ellul, ibid. at 18.
28. Ibid., c. 1.
29. J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984), quoted in Burris, Technocracy at Work, supra note 26 at 48.
30. Postman, supra note 26 at 89-91.
31. For an account of the history and ideologies of technocratic thought, see Bumris
(1993), supra note 26 at c. 2.
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Technical Discourse and Ideology
The relationship between discourse and ideology has been fraught witd
controversy. While a thorough exposition of the issues is beyond the scope ot
this paper, I take the view that both concepts offer something useful in terms oi,
explaining the relationship between power and knowledge, that each is rather
limited without the other, and that they provide complementary rather than
opposing or mutually exclusive analyses of social life.3
2
The concept of discourse emphasizes the role of language in constructing
the truth and knowledge of a society, and sees language as a site of struggle and
a medium for the exercise of power. Thus truth consists not in some external
reality, but in "the rules according to which the true and the false are separated
and specific effects of power attached to the true." 33 Each society has its own
regime or general politics of truth; "that is, the types of discourse which it
accepts and makes function as true." 34 In our era, truth is located in the form of
scientific discourse, and the institutions which produce it.35 As Ursula Franklin
has remarked (quoting Ruth Hubbard), scientists are the "socially sanctioned
fact-makers" of our time. 36 This is true not only of the natural or physical
sciences, but of social science disciplines as well. Indeed, the claim to scientific
rationality in any context can be seen as an exercise of power.
I argue in the next part that the problem of budgetary deficits has been
constructed through technical discourses that derive their power in part from
their connection to the truth-telling regime of scientific rationality. I suggest that
it is important to problematize these discourses by exposing the politics and
partiality of technical and quantitative knowledge. I think there is currently a
lack of epistemological space for other discourses to address the qualitative
moral and political choices underlying deficit reduction policies, and the daily
impact of those policies on less powerful citizens.
32. For a fuller discussion, see especially Philipps & Young, supra note 15 at 247-50.
See also S. Boyd, "Some Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analysis of Law,
Family and State: Ideology and Discourse in Child Custody Law" (1991) 10
Canadian Journal of Family Law 79; B. Cossman, "Family Inside/Out" (1994) 44
University of Toronto Law Journal 1; T. Purvis & A. Hunt, "Discourse, Ideology,
Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology ..." (1993) 44 British Journal of Society
473; M. Kline, "The Colour of Law: Ideological Representations of First Nations
in Legal Discourse" (1994) 3 Social & Legal Studies 451; C. Weedon, Feminist
Practice & Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) at 27-32.
33. Foucault, supra note 26 at 132.
34. Ibid at 131.
35. Ibid.
36. U. Franklin, "From Knowledge to Power: Has Science Policy Swallowed
Science?" (Lecture at the University of Victoria, 30 September 1994)
[unpublished].
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The concept of ideology is helpful in unpacking this relationship between
fiscal discourse and larger patterns of social and economic inequality. It best
captures the way that technical discourses elide their own politics, asserting their
own neutrality while at the same time advancing particular norms about how
society should be ordered. I use the term 'ideology' here to refer to clusters of
beliefs, attitudes and images through which the power relations of a society are
presented as natural and uncontestable. As Kline has written, the concept of
ideology problematizes the common sense of a society, asserting that it "has
developed historically, within particular relations of race, gender, class and
sexual identity, and so on." 37 Ideology and discourse are related in that discourse
is the medium in which multiple ideologies conflict, intersect, and interact to
produce knowledge. 38
What is interesting about technical discourses is not just that they exercise
power through their claim to scientificity and through their own normative
frameworks but that they simultaneously deny they are doing so. They are able
to juggle this contradiction through their close alliance with the rationalist
ideology discussed earlier in this Part, that separates value from fact, subject
from object, and normative from descriptive. Fischer describes this process as
"the translation of basic normative questions into technical issues pertaining to
instrumental means, [whereby] technical rationality and its 'value-neutral'
methodologies disengage decisions from the social and political contexts that
give them meaning." 39 This disengaging effect poses a threat to democratic
values.
The danger is that, by removing issues from the realm of political discourse
into the language of science, technical discourses reduce the space for
participation in decisions and reserve the discussion for those constructed as
experts. 4° Experts are indeed asked to solve all sorts of non technical problems,
on which they may be uniquely unqualified to speak because of the narrowness
of their knowledge and training.41 Moreover, the specialized language of experts
makes their deliberations inaccessible to most people. Writing about economists,
for example, Ellul describes their discipline as "The Secret Way," involving a
vocabulary which is "incomprehensible to the outsider even when it is
employed, as often happens, to enunciate the most obvious facts."' 42 He goes so
far as to assert that "[n]o democracy is possible in the face of a perfected
37. Kline, supra note 32 at 452.
38. Ibid. at 453. See also authors cited at note 32.
39. Fischer, supra note 26 at 359.
40. Burris, Technocracy at Work, supra note 26 at 45, drawing on M. Foucault,
Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1977).
41. Postman, supra note 26 at 87ff.
42. Ellul, supra note 26 at 162.
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economic technique." 4 3 Similar kinds of fears are warranted in relation to fiscal
discourse.
Taxation has profound political implications for all citizens because of its
effect on the distribution of income and wealth among individuals and social
classes. Tax policy development, however, has been captured to a large degree
by specialists. In discussing budgetary processes, Doern describes the "tax
policy community" as a group comprised primarily of "tax lawyers, accountants,
and financial experts who represent corporate and other clients and actually
understand and deal with the details of the tax system and of tax laws."
44
Douglas Hartle, former research director for the Royal Commission on Taxation
during the 1960s (also known as the Carter Commission), has expressed
concerns about the political impact of the "massive upgrading of the quantity
and quality of expertise" 45 in the tax policy field. He worries that tax reform
debates "will be dominated by highly technical discussions that will not be
communicated to the general public and, even more important, some of the
larger (and dare I say more important?) issues will not be addressed at all."' 46 In
fact, he suggests, it was the very lack of specialized training among the
Commission's staff that led it to recommend quite radically progressive changes
to the tax system which met with tremendous opposition from tax professionals
and the business community, and ultimately from the government as well. 4 7
It must also be remembered that the expert/non-expert distinction is a
gendered one that has particularly excluded women from the realm of
authoritative knowledge. While the objects that men make and manipulate tend
to be coded as technical, the reproductive work that women most often do, and
the objects they make and manipulate are constructed as nontechnical, natural,
and humanistic. 48 Further, Burris' work demonstrates that, at least in the United
States, the expert/non-expert hierarchy in the paid labour force is structured not
43. Ibid.
44. G. B. Doern, "Fairness, Budget Secrecy, and Pre-Budget Consultations in Ontario,
1985-1992" in A. M. Maslove, ed.,Taxing and Spending: Issues of Process
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 1 at 13.
45. D. Hartle, "Some Analytical, Political and Normative Lessons from Carter" in
N. Brooks, ed., The Quest for Tax Reform (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 401 at 403.
46. Ibid
47. Ibid On the political resistance to the Carter Commission Report and the role of
tax professionals in this process, see L. T. MacDonald, Taxing Comprehensive
Income: Power and Participation in Canadian Politics, 1962-1972 (Ph.D.
dissertation, Carleton University, 1985) [hereinafter Taxing Comprehensive
Income];L. T. MacDonald, "Why the Carter Commission Had To Be Stopped" in
Brooks, ed., supra note 45 at 351.
48. S. Curry Jansen, "Gender and the Information Society: A Socially Structured
Silence" (1989) Communication 196. See also Franklin, supra note 26, at 16,
where she notes that "[w]hen certain technologies and tools are predominantly
used by men, then maleness becomes part of the definition of those technologies."
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only by gender but by race and class. 49 The tendency to disqualify women's
knowledge as unobjective or irrational plays out in a variety of ways in the legal
system, for example when the evidence of (frequently male) experts is relied
upon to define and validate women's experiences of violence. 50 Undoubtedly,
the admission of expert evidence about "battered women's syndrome" or "rape
trauma syndrome" can be beneficial in helping women secure greater legal
protection from assault. What I wish to draw attention to here, however, is the
fact that women's own accounts of this reality do not carry the same authority as
those of a professionally or scientifically trained expert who inevitably
reinterprets the women's experience through the lens of the expert discourse.
This raises questions about how technical discourses may both advance and
undermine feminist challenges to the legal system, questions which resurface in
the final part of the paper.
What is the ideological content of technical discourses beyond their
insistence that they have no ideology and represent a superior form of
knowledge? One of the hallmarks of such discourses is that they avoid explicit
discussion of any ends or goals whatsoever, focusing only on determining the
best, most efficient means. As Lacey has put it, "all too often the actual
specification of the relevant goals and values is avoided, being obscured within a
discourse in which efficiency appears to become the end as well as the means." 51
This depoliticization is superficial only, however, in that the emphasis on
control, stability, and efficiency amounts to an ideology of system preservation
that places the larger question about what kind of system we want beyond the
bounds of discussion. 52 In this manner, technical discourses play an active part
in normalizing and sustaining the social and economic inequalities produced by
fiscal law and policy.
This is not to suggest that such discourses are merely willfully blind to
inequality. Beyond a simple preference for the status quo, they may also actively
promote certain ideologically specific forms of social ordering over others.
Specific bits of technical discourse can be loaded with any number of cultural
ideologies through the assumptions they make, the questions they ask, what
evidence they find to be relevant, and what conclusions they draw from a body
of evidence. For instance, statistics allow for the exercise of bureaucratic power
"by determining classifications within which people must think of themselves
49. Burris, supra note 26.
50. See M. Shaffer, "R. v. Lavallee: A Review Essay" [1990] 22 Ottawa Law Review
607; and Smart, supra note 16 at 47.
51. N. Lacey, "Government as Manager, Citizen as Consumer: The Case of the
Criminal Justice Act 1991" [1994] 57 Modem Law Review 534 at 534.
52. See Burris, Technocracy at Work, supra note 26 at c. 6.
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and of the actions that are open to them. '53 A classic example is the collection of
census data using an ideologically specific definition of a family unit that does
not recognize the existence of lesbian and gay couples, or the extended family
networks which are more prevalent in First Nations communities, rendering the
unique experiences of these groups invisible. 54 Likewise, feminist economists
have shown how the liberal ideology that sees human beings as autonomous,
self-interested actors has shaped mainstream economic doctrine, obscuring the
degree to which production in the public market place is dependent upon the
private reproductive labour of women. 55 The point is that technical discourses
can help to produce and normalize inequalities by inserting dominant ideologies
into fiscal law and policy, presenting such ideologies as part of an objective
truth.
Feminist philosophers of science have deconstructed the notion of pure
objectivity, demonstrating the impossibility of insulating scientific inquiry from
its context of social values, beliefs, ideologies, and politics. Moreover, these
theorists have gone beyond the "woman question in science," to consider "'the
science question in feminism": 'Is it possible to use for liberatory ends sciences
that are apparently so intimately involved in Western, bourgeois, and masculine
projects?"' 56 In pursuit of this goal, they have attempted in various ways to
explode the dualistic epistemology of traditional science, and have appealed for
a new model of knowledge which places the scientist within the field of
observation, and recognizes the locatedness of all knowledge. Harding's
standpoint epistemology, for example, seeks to enhance scientific objectivity by
giving greater weight to the questions, experiences and observations of the
marginalized. 57 Longino's model of science as socially produced attempts to
recognize the vulnerability of all science to political interests and values, while
53. I. Hacking, "How should we do the history of statistics?" in G. Burchell,
C. Gordon & P. Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 181 at 194.
54. See Philipps, "Tax Policy", supra note 15.
55. See, for example, P. England, "The Separative Self: Androcentric Bias in
Neoclassical Assumptions" in M. A. Ferber & J. A. Nelson, eds., Beyond
Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1993) 37; N. Folbre & H. Hartmann, "The Rhetoric of Self-Interest:
Ideology and Gender in Economic Theory" in A. Klamer, D. McCloskey &
R. Solow, eds., The Consequences of Economic Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988) 184.
56. S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991) at vii.
57. Ibid. See also S. Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is 'Strong
Objectivity'?" in L. Alcoff & E. Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemology (New York:
Routledge, 1993) 49.
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securing some guarantee of objectivity by exposing research to critical
conversation within an inclusive scientific community.
58
Such attempts to revise the dominant epistemology have generated lively
debate, and disagreement still abounds as to the possibility of creating empirical
or scientific knowledge which reflects and advances feminist political
commitments. 59 This debate bears directly on the question visited in the last part
of this paper, which is whether and how feminists should deploy technical
discourses in their struggles to change the fiscal system. Before pursuing this
further, however, I want to apply some of the ideas developed so far to the
problem of the deficit.
Deconstructing the Deficit: Technical Discourses and Fiscal Policy
In this part, I want to problematize what has become the dominant view in
Canada, that governments must drastically reduce their social welfare spending,
and that this is a matter of economic necessity rather than political choice. One
of the reasons that deficit-fighting agendas'have resisted political scrutiny so
well, I argue, is that they have been framed discursively as belonging to the
realms of economics, accounting, mathematics, statistics and other technical
knowledges with a strong claim to scientificity.
Drawing on examples from government documents, think-tank
publications, media reports and academic literature, I attempt to show how the
deficit is constructed as a problem with one right answer, determinable through
the apparently neutral tools of scientific analysis. Program cuts are thus
presented as the only rational response to public debt, and other possible
responses are disqualified as ideological, unobjective, unrealistic, uninformed, or
sentimental. I argue that technical discourses have worked to depoliticize one of
the most pressing social conflicts of our time, translating it into a matter of
expert knowledge and shrinking the space for popular resistance to the harmful
effects of such policies on many citizens. At the same time, they have helped to
legitimate the way restraint policies exploit and deepen class, gender and other
social inequalities by promoting an ideological vision of society in which market
58. H. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific
Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
59. For a sampling of different perspectives, see B. Bar On, "Marginality and
Epistemic Privilege" in Alcoff & Potter, eds., supra note 57 at 83; R. Campbell,
"The Virtues of Feminist Empiricism" (1994) Hypatia 90; S. Crasnow, "Can
Science Be Objective? Longino's Science as Social Knowledge" (1993) Hypatia
194; N. Tuana, "The Radical Future of Feminist Empiricism" (1992) Hypatia 100.
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power is minimally constrained, and individuals are held personally responsible
for their own economic difficulties. 60
The Numbers Game
One of the most striking features of mainstream accounts of the deficit issue are
their heavy reliance on quantification and what Postman has called the
mathematical version of reality. Dollar figures, percentages, and ratios are
frequently presented as offering some self-evident information or conclusion,
without explicit discussion of why or how a particular measurement is relevant,
and without comparison to other relevant measures. This is nicely illustrated by
a Pre-Budget Conference Workbook created by the Canada West Foundation at
the request of the Department of Finance, to assist in public consultations prior
to the 1994 federal budget. The Workbook begins with an "Economic Growth
and Debt Quiz" for participants to test their knowledge. It consists of 12
multiple-choice questions, each one strongly numerical in focus. For example:
1. Canada's economy is the largest in the world.
[(a) 5th; (b) 7th; (c) 12th; (d) 21st] ...
7. By March of 1994, Canadians will owe __ in federal government
debt.
[(a) $40 billion, (b) 250 billion, (c) $510 billion, (d) $700 billion]
8. The single largest expenditure of the Government of Canada is,
[(a) UI Payments, (b) Health, (c) Interest on Debt, (d) Social Assistance]
9. In the ten seconds it takes to read this question, the federal government
will pay - in interest on the debt:
[(a) $750, (b) $1,520, (c) $5,002, (d) 12,530] ...
11. A Canadian family of four pays - in taxes per month for interest on
federal debt:
[(a) $57, (b) $135, (c) $204, (d) $458]
For participants who get fewer than seven of the answers correct, the Workbook
says, "Uh oh-you really do need this workbook."'61
This simple questionnaire reveals much about the way quantification can
shape the production of knowledge, by making only certain kinds of facts
relevant while excluding others from the discussion. First, the presentation of the
issues in terms of figures only discourages any overt qualitative thinking about
the moral and political implications of deficit reduction. The personal norms or
experiences that might inform such judgments are marginalized by the
suggestion that lack of knowledge about such figures will place one at a
60. See C. Denis, "'Government Can Do Whatever It Wants': Moral Regulation in
Ralph Klein's Alberta" (1995) 32 C.R.S.A. 365.
61. Incidentally, the answers are: 1(b), 7(c), 8(c), 9(d), 11 (d).
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disadvantage in the policy discussion to follow. The message is clear-this is the
type of knowledge that counts.
This is a good example of what Postman described as technical
machinery-technocratic tools that translate complex and multifaceted realities
into unidimensional, quantitative facts with the aura of political neutrality. 62 The
same can be said of the graphs and charts that almost always accompany text on
the deficit. Like the Globe and Mail's editorial page, these representations assert
the point of view that " ...pressure for reform [of social programs] in Canada
arises much more from arithmetic than from ideology." 63 Federal Finance
Minister Paul Martin has also declared that the debt and deficit are "facts of
arithmetic" rather than "inventions of ideology." 64 This assertion of rationality
and exactitude is a way of claiming epistemic privilege for the dominant fiscal
agenda, and disqualifying dissenting views. To echo Brodie, it "elevates
economics over politics and suggests [fiscal restraint] ... is somehow inevitable,
neutral, and beyond our control." '65
Beyond its overt emphasis on quantities, however, the quiz also presents a
qualitative viewpoint on the deficit, in its choice of which numerical information
is significant, and in the way it limits the range of possible answers to its own
questions. Here we encounter the contradictory or duplicitous aspect of technical
discourse in that it asserts particular normative positions while simultaneously
denying that it is doing so. This contradiction is made possible by the ideology
of scientific rationality discussed in Part I.
How does the quiz communicate a normative stance? First, question 8
associates debt with social spending, rather than other kinds of spending, or
other possible causes of deficits. The current dominance of the idea that deficits
are caused by government overspending is perhaps most powerfully illustrated
by the rhetoric of the 1995 federal budget, which trumpeted the fact that new
spending cuts would outstrip tax increases by a ratio of 7 to 1.66 The 1996
62. Postman, supra note 26.
63. "Abella's lament" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 May 1995). In a similar vein,
the same newspaper commented more recently that Mike Harris, the Conservative
Premier of Ontario, "is not cutting out of spite. He is cutting because, unlike his
predecessor [NDP Premier Bob Rae], he can count": "Is Mike Harris Really
Heartless?" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (8 September 1995) A20.
64. Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Canada, 1995) at 2. More recently
Martin showed that he understands the politics of speaking mathematically. In
rejecting opposition calls for even more severe budgetary restraint he stated that
... draconian budgets are not difficult to write. The arithmetic is painless. But the
human consequences are not." Budget Speech (Department of Finance, Canada,
1996) at 8.
65. J. Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women's
Movement (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1995) at 50.
66. Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Canada, 1995) at 4.
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federal budget continued with this theme by declaring that "governments created
the deficit burden ... so governments must resolve it ... by getting spending
down, not by putting taxes up." 67 This account ignores the possibility that
deficits could also be understood in terms of our failure to collect adequate tax
revenues, particularly from wealthier groups, 68 or our subsidization of private
capital accumulation, and of services that predominantly benefit the already
privileged in society. In light of the evidence which suggests that social
spending has been a very small contributor to public debt,69 these programs have
borne a disproportionate share of cutbacks in recent years.70 There is a
substantial body of literature that points to other factors-tax expenditures, high
interest rate policies, the cost of recessions and high unemployment-as bigger
67. Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Canada, 1996) at 7. The budget
documents indicate that expenditure cuts account for 87% of the total combined
fiscal actions in the Liberal government's three budgets: Budget Plan (Department
of Finance, Canada, 1996) at 11. As a result of measures announced in these
budgets, total program spending will fall by $14.5 billion (12.1%) over the five-
year period from 1993-1994 to 1998-1999. By the final year, the government
estimates that program spending will be at its lowest, relative to GDP, since 1949-
1950, and will be about 60% of what it was during the mid-1970s and mid-1980s
(ibid. at 11-12).
68. See D. A. Wolfe, "The Politics of the Deficit" in G. B. Doern, The Politics of
Economic Policy (studies for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada, vol. 40) (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1985) 111. See also works cited, supra note 9.
69. See the controversial Statistics Canada study, "The Growth of the Federal Debt"
(June 1991) 4:6 Canadian Economic Observer 3.1, which concluded that only a
miniscule portion of the debt (less than 2%) can be attributed to social welfare
programs. Statistics Canada subsequently published a brief note which qualified
certain aspects of this study, and expressed regret for having "added to
controversy": "Note regarding the article 'The Growth of the Federal Debt"'
(1991) 3 Canadian Economic Observer.17. Linda McQuaig has asserted in her
gripping journalistic account of the deficit issue that this note was published after
Statistics Canada was subject to political pressure, particularly by the Department
of Finance: L. McQuaig, Shooting the Hippo: Death by Deficit and Other
Canadian Myths (Toronto: Viking, 1995) at 53-63.
70. Of the $25.6 billion in expenditure cuts made by the 1994, 1995 and 1996 federal
budgets, reductions in cash transfers to the provinces for health care services, post-
secondary education, social assistance and social services accounted for $7 billion,
or roughly 27%; Budget Plan (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Canada, 1996) at
110. This figure does not include cuts to direct social spending by federal
government departments. In Ontario, the Conservative government of Mike Harris
reduced social assistance rates by over 21%, to pay for approximately 20% of the
government's total fiscal austerity program. See Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of
Community and Social Services) Ontario Court of Justice (GD), 8 February 1996
590/95 at para. 367.
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culprits in the build-up of public debt. 71 The preference for spending cuts also
overlooks the danger of impairing our social stability, and our capacity for future
economic productivity. 72
Returning again to the quiz, questions 9 and 11 are obviously designed to
appeal to economic fears. They make participants feel the deficit as an
individual burden and as an imminent threat to their economic security.
Nowhere does the quiz draw attention to the economic and social benefits
derived from investments made with public borrowings, the amount of revenue
collected in 10 seconds, the value of our accumulated national wealth, the fact
that much interest on the debt is paid to Canadian investors and remains in our
economy or, conversely, to the number of people added to food bank lines or the
number of jobs lost due to welfare and other social program cuts. The sense of
crisis around the deficit is highly functional for reducing resistance to severe
belt-tightening measures. A United States government report on the politics of
deficit reduction surveyed the experience of other countries, including Canada,
and concluded with remarkable candor that "[1]eaders succeeded in using ...
various appeals to promote a new sense of urgency about the deficit. Opposition
parties and interest groups then had little choice but to frame their policies in a
fiscal austerity context. ' 73 As discussed in the next section, this air of crisis is
often cultivated through metaphors of physical disaster.
Quiz question 11 obscures the unequal effects of fiscal policy on different
groups by appealing to an image of a universal taxpaying family of four. This is
a common theme of deficit literature, to construct all citizens as taxpayers
71. See G. B. Doern, A. M. Maslove & M. J. Prince, Public Budgeting in Canada:
Politics, Economics and Management (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988)
[reprinted 19911 at 20; P. Dungan & T. Wilson, "Altering the Fiscal-Monetary
Policy Mix: Credible Policies to Reduce the Federal Deficit" (1985) Canadian Tax
Journal 309; P. Fortin, The Rising Federal Debt: Why, How Bad, What Should We
Do? (Sainte-Foy: Universitd Laval, Groupe de Recherche en Politique
tconomique, May 1985); P. Fortin, "Let's Turn the Macroeconomic Policy Mix
Upside Down" (1993) 14:6 Policy Options 15; C. Gonick, The Great Economic
Debate (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987) at 148-53; R. D. Kneebone, "Deficits and
Debt in Canada: Some Lessons from Recent History" (1994) 22 Canadian Public
Policy 152; McQuaig, supra note 69; G. Rosenbluth, "The Political Economy of
Deficit-Phobia" in R. C. Allen & G. Rosenbluth, eds., False Promises: The Failure
of Conservative Economics (Vancouver: New Star, 1992) 61; Wolfe, supra note
68. See also Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and CHOICES, Alternative
Federal Budget 1996 Framework Document (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 1996)
72. See L. Osberg, "Sustainable Social Development" in Allen & Rosenbluth, eds.,
ibid. 227. See also "The Remaking of New Zealand" Ideas (transcript 12-19
October 1994, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation).
73. United States General Accounting Office, Deficit Reduction: Experiences of Other
Nations (GAO/AIMD-95-30) (December 1994) at 54.
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positioned in essentially the same way in relation to the state. Lacey has noted a
similar trend in Britain to construct citizens as fungible "consumers" of public
services, and warns that such a concept of citizenship effectively sidelines those
who lack the material or cultural resources to access public services equitably. 
74
Likewise, according such high priority to deficit reduction through social
spending cuts has profoundly unequal effects across Canada's social spectrum,
and in particular threatens to exacerbate class and gender inequalities in ways
discussed in greater detail below.
References to the universal taxpayer are often accompanied by statements
to the effect that this taxpayer is fatigued and that there is no further room for tax
increases of any kind. The undesirability of raising taxes is often asserted not as
a political preference of certain groups but as harmful or counterproductive for
the economy as a whole. The Canadian Tax Foundation, for example, in a pre-
budget submission to an Ontario legislative committee, took a strong stand
against any provincial tax increases. 75 Many of the Foundation's arguments were
based on its view that there is growing political resistance to higher taxes, and,
consequently, a risk of incurring the "wrath of the average taxpayer," or of
attracting "concerted opposition" to any new tax measure. However, economic
and statistical measures were also invoked to suggest that the country is at or
near its "maximum tax burden."
Though we are warned that determining the maximum tax burden is "not
an exact science," the submission makes a strong implicit claim to scientificity
through its ample use of quantitative indicators. It is noted, for example, that
since 1980 the overall tax burden had risen about seven per cent relative to gross
domestic product (GDP), and that Canadian personal income taxes sat at 14.5
per cent of GDP in 1992, compared to only 10.1 per cent in the United States.
Though corporate income taxes, by contrast, were "well below" the level in
other industrialized countries, no increase was advised here because of the "full
mobility of capital" under free trade, and because multinational corporations can
avoid taxes by shifting accounting profits to lower tax jurisdictions. The
presentation of this analysis as neutral and objective truth is strengthened by the
Foundation's description of itself as "an independent research organization" with
expertise in fiscal policy, that "does not engage in lobbying or policy advocacy."
The statistical data presented by the Tax Foundation is presumably
accurate, but again, selected bits of data cannot alone resolve what are
essentially political questions about the proper level and distribution of the tax
burden. Quite to the contrary, I would argue that empirical information was used
here in a manner that tends to hinder rather than enhance democratic
conversation about these critical value choices. Framing the argument in the
74. Lacey, supra note 51 at 553-54.
75. Canadian Tax Foundation, Submission to the Ontario Select Committee on Finance
and Economic Affairs (7 February 1995).
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language of technical expertise deflects criticism of the document's own
normative standpoint. A brief deconstructive effort will show that the
Foundation's submission generates more questions than answers.
Taken in the abstract, a history of recent growth in the overall level of
taxation casts doubt on the merits of further tax increases. When this fact is
restored to its political context, however, its significance may be greatly altered.
In particular, we need information about the distribution of the tax burden, and
whether the wealthier sectors of society have shared equitably in recent tax
increases. It should be noted that the tax lawyers and accountants who comprise
the bulk of the Foundation's membership act mostly on behalf of large corporate
clients rather than the "average taxpayer" invoked in the document. 76 As well,
the appropriateness of overall tax levels cannot be assessed without some
background vision of the proper role of the state in society. It may well be that
Canadians have settled on a different political vision of the state than Americans
and that our current tax levels are quite modest in relation to the level of public
services enjoyed by citizens. Likewise, the Foundation's assertion that
governments have little power to control the tax or investment behavior of
corporations is not value-neutral but suggests a particular (and currently popular)
neoliberal vision of how the state should constitute itself. It also glosses over the
important fact that tax rates are only one determinant of business location, along
with many other factors such as access to raw materials, skilled labour, markets,
and a smoothly functioning public infrastructure to facilitate industrial
transportation, communication, etc.
It is perhaps tempting to discount some of the foregoing examples of deficit
discourse on the basis that they were produced by advocacy groups of one kind
or another, working quite consciously to further the agenda of a particular
government or interest group. It is significant, however, that they do not present
themselves in this way, or admit to having any normative viewpoint about public
finance. Rather, they purport to offer objective information. My point is that
these types of texts have significantly influenced public thinking about deficits,
in part because of their image of expert neutrality. In any event, similar features
can be observed in the most rigorously academic treatments of the deficit issue.
A good example can be found in the debate within economics literature over the
direction of causality between government spending and revenue collection.
76. For an analysis of the Canadian Tax Foundation's connections to corporate
interests and its role in opposing progressive tax reforms in the 1960s and 19 70s,
see MacDonald, Taxing Comprehensive Income, supra note 47.
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Overspending versus Undertaxing
The causality debate starts from the premise that there is wide consensus on the
need to reduce public debt and the size of government, and inquires into the
most efficient means of achieving these goals. To this end, economists have
sought to determine whether state spending causes higher taxation or whether
the converse is true. This, in turn, generates conclusions about whether deficits
are predominantly caused by overspending or by inadequate taxation. While this
seems a rather tautological sort of debate, emphasizing one or the other of these
causal factors can lead to radically different policy prescriptions. Whereas
"supporters of higher taxes say that new revenues will balance the federal
budget, 77 others insist on expenditure cuts because "increasing taxes will
simply lead to more government spending."' 78
Canadian economists Ahiakpor and Amirkhalkhali have usefully set out the
competing arguments about the principal source of deficits. 79 The "excessive
spending" hypothesis, as they describe it, "emphasizes the ease with which
spending programs can be extended, primarily to suit the interests of
politicians," and that levels of taxation represent a "mandate" from the
community about acceptable levels of spending. 80 According to this view,
deficits are caused by politicians' failure to respect the limits of this tax mandate.
Moreover, increasing tax revenues is believed simply to lead to greater program
spending by governments. The only effective way to reduce deficits, by this
logic, is to make expenditure cuts. The "inadequate taxation" theory, on the
other hand, presupposes that "a government is established to fulfill the vision or
mandate of society," and that it is this social mandate that drives government
spending and the decision to raise revenues. By this analysis, governments
should accede to society's demands for more costly programs by raising
sufficient tax revenues to pay for them. 81
Ahiakpor and Amirkhalkhali go on to interpret historical data on Canadian
government revenues and expenditures. 82 They find qualified support for the
"excessive spending" thesis, and conclude that "to attack the problem of
persistent deficits, Canada ... should focus more on spending cuts or fiscal
77. W. Anderson, M. S. Wallace & J. T. Warner, "Government Spending and
Taxation: What Causes What?" (1985/86) 52 Southern Economic Journal 630 at
631.
78. Ibid..
79. J. C. W. Ahiakpor & S. Amirkhalkhali, "On the Difficulty of Eliminating Deficits
with Higher Taxes: Some Canadian Evidence" (1989) 56 Southern Economic
Journal 24.
80. Ibid. at 25-26.
81. Ibid
82. Ibid at 27-30.
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restraint rather than on finding ways of raising additional revenue from taxes."8 3
What is most interesting about this article, for the purposes of my analysis, is the
authors' attempt to find scientific answers to the highly political questions they
raise. Much like the less academic texts discussed earlier, they suggest that the
question of which hypothesis better describes the cause of deficits is an
"empirical" one. 84 What this tends to suppress is that both hypotheses
necessarily are informed by normative values about how Canadian society
should be ordered. Whereas the "excessive spending" theory constructs civil
society as an aggregate of individuals determined above all to cede only limited
amounts of wealth to the state, "inadequate taxation" constructs society much
more as a collective with interests and goals beyond private wealth
accumulation.
While empirical data may illuminate some of the implications of pursuing
different political visions, it cannot by itself resolve the normative question as to
what constitutes a good society. The problem, again, is that technical discourses
often present their ideological predilections as neutral expertise. Indeed,
according to Gonick, "[a]mong social scientists, economists are the most
insistent about the value-free nature of their inquiry." 8
5
In the article by Ahiakpor and Amirkhalkhali, the political dimension of the
preference for expenditure controls is obscured by constructing the tax mandate
as something set by society as a whole, which is then disregarded by self-
interested politicians. Much like the "Economic Growth and Debt Quiz" and the
Canadian Tax Foundation submission, this tends to elide inequalities among
taxpayers, and the role that governments have in redistributing income and
wealth from one group of citizens to another through progressive taxation and
social spending. Elsewhere in the article, however, the authors exhibit a clear
preference for less redistribution. Before embarking on their empirical analysis
they state:
[T]here are strong a priori arguments on the side of the excessive government
spending hypothesis. They include the fact that many of those who call for
increased government spending on their behalf, particularly "welfare
programs," pay little in taxes because they earn the least (or no) income, and
are also taxed at the lowest rates. Such requests, therefore, do not necessarily
represent a willingness by most income earners to cede a greater portion of
their income to government ... 86
What is stated here as obvious, presumptive fact is based on highly questionable
assumptions and stereotypes. Just like the quiz discussed earlier, this passage
83. Ibid. at 31.
84. Ibid. at 26.
85. Gonick, supra note 71 at 19.
86. Ahiakpor & Amirkhalkhali, supra note 79 at 26, 27.
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associates deficits with welfare or social spending, without regard to the
evidence that such expenditures have declined over the last two decades and
have contributed relatively little to the accumulation of debt.8 7 The amount of
deficit spending that has benefited middle-class and wealthier Canadians is not
explored, nor is the interest such groups have in preserving public health care,
subsidized post-secondary education, or corporate tax expenditures. Lower
income people are constructed as non-taxpayers or minimal taxpayers, whose
views therefore must not be representative of the true tax mandate set by
mainstream society. This assumes a far more progressive tax and transfer system
than Canada actually has. It overlooks the fact that even those with low incomes
pay substantial taxes, especially through commodity and other flat taxes that are
not geared to income. 88 And it ignores the further downward redistribution of the
tax burden which took place in the 1980s, with the introduction of the Goods
and Services Tax and the flattening of the marginal rate structure in the ITA .89 It
seems likely that these authors' strong a priori views helped shape their selection
and interpretation of the empirical data.
Indeed, differences in political vision may help to account for the diversity
of economic opinion in this area. In the American context, Anderson, Wallace
and Warner concluded that federal government spending leads to higher taxes
rather than the reverse. Their study, they assert, "support[s] a view of the world
in which the political system somehow determines how much to spend and then
looks for revenue sources to finance that level of spending ..."90 Though
Anderson et al. do not state a preference for higher taxes as the best response to
deficits, their sense that government is driven by a political mandate rather than
a fiscal one accords well with the "inadequate taxation" thesis rejected by
Ahiakpor and Amirkhalkhali, and its different assumptions about what motivates
citizens and governments.
In this section and the previous one, I have focused on interrogating the
truth claims asserted by dominant discourses on the deficit, and how their
emphasis on rational expertise closes down political debate. I have also argued
that ideologically specific norms and values are introduced into these technical
discourses through the selection of relevant data, appropriate comparators, and a
priori assumptions. In the next section, I extend this analysis to the metaphors of
deficit talk.
87. See supra note 69.
88. See Low Income Tax Relief Working Group Report (Ontario Fair Tax Commission,
December 1992).
89. Brooks, supra note 7.
90. Anderson, Wallace & Warner, supra note 77 at 630. For a view that lies
somewhere in between, see R. Ram, "Additional Evidence on Causality between
Government Revenue and Government Expenditure" (1987/88) 54 Southern
Economic Journal 763. See also J. Cullis & P. Jones, Public Finance and Public
Choice (London: McGraw-Hill International, 1992) at 376-93.
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The Metaphorical Deficit
The many vivid metaphors that are used to talk about public deficits provide a
further set of clues about the submerged normative content of the discourse. In
particular, the sense of crisis that pervades much of the literature is often
cultivated metaphorically. We hear of the "debt tinderbox," the "crushing debt,"
and the "voracious compound interest treadmill." 9 1 We are told that our
"massive addiction" 92 to borrowing has led to a "corrosive growth" 93 of debt,
placing us on a "collision course" 94 with our "darkening economic vistas." 95 We
suffer from the "crippling" 96 effects of "The Plague of the Black Debt, '97 and
are admonished to "rein in," "reel in" and "lance the debt boil." 98 What is more,
Finance Minister Martin informs us that "temporary fiscal remission" is not
enough, and the country must pursue "full fiscal health." 99
The presence of metaphors should not necessarily be taken as a sign of
weak reasoning, nor as a mere matter of ornamentation. Rather, as Donald
McCloskey has argued in the context of economics, sound analysis requires the
careful use of metaphors and storytelling, as much as it requires logic and
fact. l° ° This is part of the process whereby normative ideals and bodily
experiences are integrated into empirical thought. McCloskey also defends
social scientists' use of rhetoric: "An economist or a historian cannot avoid
writing rhetorically since any argument has a rhetoric, a style of argument,
taking 'argument' to mean 'any designs on the reader'." 101 The real problem, in
his view, is the reluctance of economists to acknowledge the normative aspect of
their analyses, and to reflect critically upon the aptness of their metaphors and
stories to describe and prescribe things about human society. 102
91. J. S. McCallum, "Debt Policy and Debt History" (1994) 15:5 Policy Options 37.
92. Bank of Novia Scotia chief economist Warren Jestin, quoted in The Financial Post
(3 June 1994) 1.
93. "Martin Takes Aim at $600-Billion" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (16 September
1994) A20.
94. "60 Minutes" (13 May 1994).
95. D. Frum, "In the Hole" Saturday Night (February 1995) 42.
96. Financial Post (16 September 1991) 1.
97. J. D. Davidson, The Plague of the Black Debt: How To Survive the Coming
Depression (Baltimore: Strategic Investment, 1994).
98. "A Well-Crafted Package Can Do More than Lance the Debt Boil" (excerpt from
C. D. Howe Institute) The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 October 1994) Al.
99. Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Canada, 1995) at 6.
100. D. McCloskey, if You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) at c. 1. See also Postman, supra note
26 at c. 9.
101. McCloskey, ibid. at 56.
102. Ibid. at c. 4.
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The frequent use of cataclysmic metaphors to tell the story of the deficit
betrays the presence of a strong argumentative agenda in the dominant
discourse. As I suggested earlier, these devices help to garner support for an
urgent pace of deficit reduction. Similarly, feminist theorists have shown how
metaphors can introduce particular images of, and ideas about, women into
scientific knowledge and practice.' 0 3 In this regard, it is interesting to note how
often the deficit is metaphorically constructed as a natural or bodily force out of
control that must be mastered by human will and knowledge. There is a
connection here to the Cartesian anxiety described by Bordo with its emphasis
on masculine control of the natural universe through the rigours of scientific
rationality. 104 The historical association of women with nature, the body, and the
irrational aspects of human existence may be one reason why feminist
arguments about alternative approaches to fiscal policy often face an uphill
battle. Marjorie Cohen has noted a tendency to discount the views of women's
organizations on broad issues of economic policy: "[when] we began to talk
about economic issues like the budget, trade policy, privatization, deregulation,
and the general structure of the Canadian economy, we were going too far.
These were not women's issues: women were not 'experts' and therefore our
criticism had little credibility." 105 In another's words, the expectation is that
"[w]omen do the research on gender; men do the research on the economy."'10 6
This exclusion of feminist analyses from economic policy making is problematic
in light of the profoundly gendered impact of fiscal restraint.
103. See, for example, E. Martin, The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of
Reproduction (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987); "Language and Science: Genetics,
Embryology, and the Discourse of Gene Action" in E. Fox Keller, ed., Refiguring
Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995).
104. Bordo, supra note 22. Lacey, supra note 51 at 553, also notes the masculine
overtones of metaphors surrounding the efficient, managerialist state, especially
the emphasis on better "performance" by government agencies
105. M. Cohen, "The Canadian Women's Movement and its Efforts to Influence the
Canadian Economy" in C. Backhouse & D. Flaherty, eds., Challenging Times: The
Women's Movement in Canada and the United States (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1992) 215 at 218-19, quoted in Brodie, supra note 65 at 47.
106. M. MacDonald, "Restructuring in the Fishing Industry in Atlantic Canada" in
I. Bakker, ed., The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy (London: Zed
Books in association with North-South Institute, 1994) 91 at 100.
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The Gendered Impact of Fiscal Austerity
Earlier in this part, I made reference to the disproportionate impact of reduced
social spending on low income people.10 7 Materials filed in the Masse case
08 -
the constitutional challenge to the reduction of welfare rates in Ontario--detail
the physical, psychological and social harms inflicted when people lose access to
adequate food, shelter, heating, and other basic requirements of subsistence. The
case also highlights the intricate ways that low-income status interacts with other
forms of social disadvantage, showing how welfare cuts impose specific kinds of
costs on poor women and their children, and on low-income people with
disabilities. For individual applicants, the reductions meant a loss of autonomy
and control over matters as fundamental as the custody of children, the decision
to remain separated from an abusive husband, and whether to place a disabled
child in institutionalized care. 109 At a more general level, because women are
overrepresented among the poor, they are more likely to require social assistance
and other social services, and to suffer from their removal.
Martha Jackman has pointed out that the abolition of the Canada
Assistance Plan as of 1 April 1996 has particularly negative implications for
women. 110 Not only will total federal funding for provincial social programming
decline substantially, but most of the national standards governing provincial
welfare plans will be removed, including the right to assistance based on need,
whatever the reason for the need, and the requirement that provinces take into
account the basic requirements of living in setting welfare rates. Nor can women
be assured that provincial governments will continue to allocate funds for
previous shared-cost programs such as civil legal aid, sexual assault counselling,
and subsidized child care, or for transition houses. III
In addition to the fact that women disproportionately must rely on social
services, many women are employed by government agencies and will lose their
jobs as the civil service is reduced. The cuts also impact on women in their
domestic roles, often meaning that "social services are shifted from the paid
work of women in the public sector to the unpaid labour of women in the
domestic sphere." 112 Reductions in the availability of public child care, health
care, education spending and welfare incomes results in a privatization of more
caring work within families, most often to be absorbed by women. At the same
time, these changes heighten the barriers to women's equal participation in the
paid labour force. The decreasing commitment of state resources to programs
107. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
108. Ibid
109. Factum of the Applicants, paras. 65-109.
110. M. Jackman, "Women and the Canada Health and Social Transfer: Ensuring
Gender Equality in Federal Welfare Reform" (1996) 8 C.J.W.L. 372.
111. Ibid. at 10.
112. Brodie, supra note 65 at 19-20.
CJLS/RCDS Vol. 11 #1 (Spring/printemps 1996)
like pay equity and affirmative action exacerbate this effect. 113 Expenditure
restraint must be seen as one aspect of a larger renegotiation of the relationship
among families, the state, and the market, which is in turn dependent upon
particular unequal gender relations.
Clearly, then, there is a pressing need for feminists and others interested in
greater social equality to address fiscal policy issues, and to contend with the
technical discourses that pervade this area. In the final part of the paper, I
examine how the power of technical language manifested itself in the Symes and
Thibaudeau cases, two recent feminist challenges to the income tax system. I
argue these decisions hold a number of lessons about the potential of technical
discourses both to advance and to hinder feminist legal and political arguments
in the fiscal sphere.
Feminist Challenges to Fiscal Discourse
The question raised in this part is how feminists can best engage with technical
discourses in the effort to obtain reforms to the tax system and the larger fiscal
order. At one level, this is simply a new version of an old problem for feminists:
the need to expose the contingent nature of seemingly objective and universal
concepts, rules, and social arrangements. The tax system poses a distinct
challenge, however, because of the extraordinary degree to which it is
dominated by expert knowledge. As discussed in Part I, tax law's association
with other technical discourses, such as economics and accounting, strengthens
its claim to scientificity. This inhibits critical conversation about tax laws by
those defined as non-experts (including, sometimes, judges), and tends to
delegitimize overtly value-based critiques of taxation.
The centrality of experiential knowledge to much feminist theorizing
makes it appear less objective than the kinds of abstract quantitative reasoning
traditionally employed within discourses like accounting and economics.
Additionally, feminist challenges to the tax system often have to do with the
treatment of women's caregiving work, with all its bodily, emotive, and
expressive associations. 114 Because it is constructed as the epitomy of rational,
113. For an overview of the gendered implications of economic restructuring policies,
see I. Bakker, "Engendering Macro-Economic Policy Reform in the Era of Global
Restructuring and Adjustment" in I. Bakker, ed., supra note 106, 1; M. Griffin
Cohen, "The Implications of Economic Restructuring for Women: The Canadian
Situation", ibid. 103.
114. The Women and Taxation Working Group, supra note 12, executive summary at 1,
made this point as follows: "[Wlomen's primary responsibility for the young, the
sick and the frail elderly is a critical factor in contributing to women's inequality
and in determining the impact of the tax system on women as compared to men. As
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economic legislation, tax law seems particularly resistant to any form of
challenge which appears to be perspectival or personal. I do not suggest this is
the only factor working against feminist challenges to fiscal policy. Rather, as I
stated at the outset, technical discourses complement other layers of politics.
The judicial treatment of feminist arguments in the Symes and Thibaudeau
cases helps to illustrate these difficulties. These cases also raise some hard
questions about when and how fiscal feminists draw upon technical discourses
to advance their own arguments. While these discursive strategies have some
liberatory potential, there are also risks associated with "putting the new wine of
critical ... theory into the old bottles of patriarchal linguistic categories." 115 A
brief summary of the cases is in order.
Beth Symes, a partner in a law firm, argued that the cost of hiring a nanny
to care for her young daughters should be fully deductible as a business expense,
either on a proper interpretation of the ITA, or pursuant to the equality rights
provision in s.15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The core of her
argument was that Revenue Canada's construction of child care expenses as
personal rather than business-related is gender-biased; it reflects a world view in
which women and their domestic activities are seen as private and separate from
the public sphere of commerce, and in effect perpetuates women's exclusion
from the business world. At trial, Cullen J. agreed with Symes, holding the
nanny's salary to be fully deductible. 116 His decision was reversed by the Federal
Court of Appeal. 117 The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Symes' appeal,
holding that Revenue Canada's denial of the deduction was justified under the
terms of the statute, and that there was no violation of Symes' sex equality
rights.'18 The majority was comprised of the seven men on the Court-the two
women dissented.
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Symes, the Federal Court of
Appeal ruled in favour of another woman, Suzanne Thibaudeau, who challenged
the taxation of her child-support payments. The Court accepted Thibaudeau's
argument that the ITA discriminated against her as a separated custodial parent
by requiring her to include child support in income while allowing a deduction
to her former husband."I9 Writing for the majority, Hugessen J.A. held that the
inclusion requirement discriminated on the basis of family status, which he
identified as a ground analagous to those enumerated in s.15 of the Charter.
a result ... the working group focused on the interaction of the tax system with this
unpaid work."
115. Curry Jansen, supra note48 at 198.
116. Symes v. The Queen (1989), 89 D.T.C. 5244 (F.C.T.D.).
117. Queen v. Symes (1991) 91 D.T.C. 5397 (F.C.A.).
118. Symes, supra note 3.
119. (1994) 114 D.L.R. (4th) 261. The so-called deduction/inclusion system is set out in
s. 56(l)(b) and s. 60(b) of the ITA. The federal government announced the
proposed repeal of these provisions as of 1 May 1997 in its 1996 budget.
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Hugessen J.A. rejected the intervenor's argument that the provisions
discriminated on the basis of sex, however, despite the fact that virtually all
persons paying tax on child support are women, and despite broad evidence of
women's post-divorce poverty relative to men. 120
The government appealed the Thibaudeau case to the Supreme Court of
Canada and won. 121 As in Symes, the majority rejected the equality challenge,
holding that the impugned provisions imposed no burden on Thibaudeau. Two
factors were central to this decision. First, the majority chose to focus on the
aggregate impact of the inclusion/deduction system on the (ex-) couple,
reasoning that the tax system actually confers a benefit by allowing the parents
to split their incomes and reduce the net tax burden on their combined incomes.
In response to the argument that in practice the custodial family often derives no
benefit from this tax subsidy and is sometimes prejudiced by the inclusion
requirement, the majority turned to the family law system. Any such inequality
between the ex-spouses is caused not by the tax system, they said, but by the
failure of family law processes to ensure an adequate level of support. Once
again, the Court split along gender lines. The two women Justices, McLachlin
and L'Heureux-Dub JJ., would have struck down the inclusion requirement on
the view that it discriminates against the custodial parent.
These two Supreme Court decisions have attracted a number of academic
commentaries. 122 My purpose here is to make a few points about the role of
technical discourses in these cases and the way such discourses both advanced
and thwarted feminist arguments. In both cases, statistical and social science
evidence was introduced to advance arguments for a feminist, or at least a more
gender-neutral tax law. In Symes, the taxpayer brought in a feminist sociologist
to testify to the increasing role of women in the paid labour market, and the
barriers posed to women due to their primary caregiving responsibilities. In
Thibaudeau, the parties and intervenors submitted studies on the financial
120. In a highly problematic passage of his judgment, ibid. at 271, Hugessen J.A.
concluded that the different treatment of payers and recipients of child
maintenance is not linked to sex because some men, though relatively small in
number, are also subject to the inclusion requirement. The fact that women make
up 98% of this group was not, in his view, sufficient by itself to establish an
adverse effect on women as a class. For a detailed analysis of the judgment see
Philipps & Young, supra note 15.
121. Thibaudeau, supra note 4.
122. See, for example, Macklin, supra note 15; L. Philipps, "Thibaudeau v. Canada:
Tax Law: Equality Rights" (1995) 4 Can. Bar Rev. 668; Philipps & Young, supra
note 15; C. Young, "Child Care and the Charter: Privileging the Privileged"
(1994) 2 Review of Constitutional Studies 20; E. Zweibel, "Thibaudeau v. R.:
Constitutional Challenge to the Taxation of Child Support Payments" (1994) 4
N.J.C.L. 305.
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impact of the taxation of child support on men and women across income
brackets.
These strategies are attractive because they can confer additional authority
on feminist arguments. They may allow us to capitalize on the positive,
democratic potential of scientific and technical knowledge, that is, its appeal to a
rational order superior to entrenched traditions or prejudices. An example of this
type of discursive strategy is evident in the history of litigation over sexual
orientation discrimination in Canada. Didi Herman has remarked upon the
judicial tendency to rely on sociological evidence to support innovative and
progressive interpretations of the law and to reject earlier interpretations as the
product of uninformed biases. 123 Indeed, I myself have enlisted statistics, social
science writings and other technical materials in this paper, in my effort to
challenge prevailing views on budget deficits. It is also true that the choice of
discursive strategy in any context is constrained in part by the existing
framework of debate. In many cases, feminists have little choice but to respond
to the technical arguments held up to justify the status quo. However, it is
important to recognize the potential pitfalls in trying to beat tax law at its own
technical game, and the subtle ways in which technical discourses may
undermine feminist politics even as they advance the immediate interests of
particular women.
First, we must be conscious that feminist social science or other expertise is
not entering a vacuum when it is presented in tax cases. Besides having to
contend with the political predispositions of individual judges, it is up against
other technical knowledge systems like economics and traditional tax policy
analysis. The gendered assumptions of these other discourses have already been
deeply internalized within the jurisprudence and provisions of tax law. As
Herman writes in the context of equality litigation by lesbians and gay men:
[Wihat judges "know" about homosexuality is less a consequence of "expert"
courtroom interventions, and more the result of the sexual politics they bring
to the decision-making process-a politics informed by their social location
and experience, as well as any or all of several other sources, including
religion, psychiatry, biology, feminism, and sociology. 124
An example of the influence of extra-legal knowledge can be seen in the
Thibaudeau case, in the majority's reliance upon a traditional economic concept
of the family unit. Mainstream economic theory has tended to reduce
heterosexual family groupings to their male breadwinners, presuming that an
increase in men's welfare benefits all members of the household. Even in more
reflective theories which recognize that families are comprised of individuals,
123. D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at c. 7.
124. Ibid. at 140.
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men are generally assumed to pool their incomes with women and children, who
are assumed to be earning less market income.
125
As many critical scholars have exposed, this image of the heteropatriarchal
family is founded on assumptions which may be accurate for some but which
grossly distort the experience of many. The assumption of a male breadwinner,
for example, does not reflect the realities of many working-class women and
women of color, whose waged work has been critical to the survival of their
families. 126 Further, in families where men are the primary earners, economic
theory exaggerates the degree to which intra-family relations are characterized
by altruism and equal sharing. Indeed, central to the feminist arguments in
Thibaudeau was the reality of economic inequality within heterosexual
marriages-the fact that women frequently do not benefit equally from market
incomes received by men, and that men do not necessarily share their incomes
willingly, especially following separation.
Despite the evidence offered to them, the majority judges in Thibaudeau
were unable or unwilling to see any problem with treating the heterosexual
family as a unified economic entity. They concluded the deduction/inclusion
system is not burdensome for women, and in fact generally confers a benefit,
because it allows for co-operative income splitting which increases the resources
available to support the children. In their words:
[W]e are ... dealing with two provisions geared to operate at the level of the
couple. They are designed to minimize the tax consequences of support
payments, thereby promoting the best interests of the children by ensuring
that more money is available to provide for their care. If anything, the
legislation in question confers a benefit on the post-divorce "family unit." It is
clear that the divorced parents still function as a unit when it comes to
providing financial and emotional support to their children ... 127
Likewise, Gonthier J. reasoned that the provision of a deduction to the ex-
husband "results in relief for the couple and a greater ability to pay and hence an
incentive to pay." 128 The statistical and social science evidence, cited abundantly
by the two women Justices in dissent, indicated that in almost 30 per cent of
cases there is no potential for income splitting at all, because the woman is
earning as much or more income than her former husband, and consequently is
125. See M. Cohen, "The Problem of Studying Economic Man" in A. Miles & G. Finn,
eds., Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics (Montreal: Black Rose,
1982); see especially J. A. Nelson, Feminism, Objectivity & Economics (London:
Routledge, 1996) at c. 5 ("Towards a Feminist Theory of the Family").
126. See, for example, S. A. M. Gavigan, "Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The
Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian and Gay Engagement to
Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 589.
127. Thibaudeau, supra note 4 at 702, per lacobucci and Cory JJ.
128. lbid at 698.
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not in a lower tax bracket. They also cited evidence that family courts often have
not adequately accounted for the tax implications of support, and noted that, in
any event, the great bulk of support arrangements are negotiated in private,
without court supervision, and often without lawyers or tax advice. In addition,
the clear evidence that women's standard of living declines relative to men's
following divorce suggests that the sense of sharing and mutual obligation
assumed by the majority is not a reality for many people.
Perhaps most striking is that the majority did not discuss the social science
evidence submitted by the taxpayer or the intervenors, even to indicate why they
rejected it. This ability to silently disqualify feminist expertise is a particular
concern given that judges are often asked to choose between two or more expert
opinions, potentially advantaging whatever appears on a superficial level to be
the best science. It seems likely that courts will very often find studies which
proceed from dominant assumptions to be more objective and authoritative.
Moreover, corporate and state interests have far greater resources than women's
groups or anti-poverty organizations to produce technically sophisticated-
looking research. There is likely to be a hierarchy of technical discourses, in
other words, in which expert evidence perceived as feminist will often be seen as
less objective.
Perhaps the best evidence of technical knowledge exercising power in
Thibaudeau, however, is the special deference accorded to tax law and
traditional tax policy concepts by the majority. While being careful to state that
tax legislation is not exempt from Charter review, they emphasized the
importance of not interfering unduly with the government's fiscal priorities.
Gonthier J. argued most strongly for this deferential approach, pointing to the
/TA's "special nature," 129 and admonishing the taxpayer as follows:
[Olne should not confuse the concept of fiscal equity, which is concerned
with the best distribution of the tax burden in light of the need for revenue, the
taxpayers' ability to pay and the economic and social policies of the
government, with the concept of the right to equality, which ... means that a
member of a group shall not be disadvantaged on account of an irrelevant
personal characteristic shared by that group. 10
Gonthier J.'s comments are a more developed version of what Ltourneau J.A.
said in his dissent in the Federal Court of Appeal: "The Income Tax Act is
essentially economic legislation, which may even be described as amoral."i
13 1
These statements appeal to the notion that tax law has its own internal logic
and imperatives that operate beyond the reach of politics. Fiscal policy is
constructed as something governed by a higher authority of objectively
129. Ibid. at 675.
130. Ibid. at 676.
131. Supra note 119 at 289.
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determined criteria which even the Court is less than fully qualified to review.
Reframing the issue as one of fiscal equity removes it neatly from the sphere of
equality discourse into the expert language of tax policy. Gonthier J.'s distinction
is nonsensical, of course, because notions of fiscal equity rely on precisely the
same ideologically charged standards and beliefs as equality rights doctrine.
Indeed, the political contingency of tax interpretation is demonstrated by the
majority's invocation of the so-called post-divorce family unit in Thibaudeau, as
discussed above. Again, however, arguments that are perceived as feminist or
otherwise politicized may be effectively disqualified when tax law is constructed
as a specialized body of knowledge.
One response to these difficulties is simply to accept them. Feminists must
always contend with more powerful, masculinist discourses in the courts, in
academe, in the popular media and in policy making processes. If greater use of
empirical data and expert languages can narrow the odds against us by creating a
more authoritative feminist discourse, some would argue this is enough. It is
significant, for instance, that both Symes and Thibaudeau managed to convince
one court on the way up, as well as both women judges on the Supreme Court of
Canada, in the process generating a body of dissenting jurisprudence that may
show the way forward in future cases. And the political controversy and
lobbying activities generated by Thibaudeau's case undoubtedly were a major
influence in the government's decision to propose the repeal of the
inclusion/deduction rules in its 1996 budget. It is entirely possible that the
marshalling of technical discourses in support of Thibaudeau's position played
some role in bringing about progressive change. Even if this is so, however, a
couple of potential problems remain.
There is a risk that addressing problems of sexism and other social biases
with scientific research may encourage the same kind of depoliticization that
occurs when such research is used to support dominant ideological positions.
The basic political and moral questions being raised by feminists may be
translated into technical matters for specialists to debate. A different but related
problem is that the subtle normative thrust of expert discourses may operate at
cross-purposes with the feminist political aims they were invoked to serve. The
Symes case provides an example.
In the successful litigation at the trial level, Cullen J. picked up on the
evidence given by the feminist sociologist, making it a central part of his
reasons. It is worth quoting him at some length:
[Tihe plaintiff exercised good business and commercial judgment in deciding
to dedicate part of her resources from the law practice to the provision of
child care. This decision was acceptable according to business principles
which include the development of intellectual capital, the improvement of
productivity, the provision of services to clients and making available the
resource which she sells, namely her time ... Further, [the expert] evidence
supports the notion that the availability of child care increases productivity by
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enhancing the peace of mind of employees. Enhancing productivity is ...
totally in keeping with well established business practices. Moreover, [the
expert] evidence indicates that the absence of child care is a barrier to
women's participation in the economy ... and therefore lowering the barrier by
arriving at a satisfactory means of dealing with the costs of child care would
make good business sense. 1
32
While this line of reasoning helped support a decision in favour of Symes,
it is important to reflect on the larger implications of framing the issue of child
care in these terms. For most of the above passage, Cullen J. distances himself
from the feminist political arguments in favour of state-subsidized child care. He
does refer to the barriers to women's participation in paid labour, but quickly
translates this back into a question of "good business sense," rather than sexual
equality. Moreover, the passage is far removed from any sense that child care
work is itself a socially and economically valuable activity, or that it would be a
good idea to distribute that work more equally between men and women.
Framing the issue in these narrow economistic terms also leaves the class and
racial politics of the private model of child care services completely
unproblematized. Audrey Macklin has detailed the vulnerability of immigrant
women, particularly women of colour, to economic, physical and sexual
exploitation as domestic workers. 133 Nor does the decision address in any way
the situation of the vast majority of women who do not earn business income,
and their lack of access to affordable child care. Does this judgment introduce a
feminist discourse into the field, or does it translate the feminist political
challenge into a technical question that fundamentally endorses existing
economic relations and their attendant inequalities?
One may argue that these problems simply reflect the limits of equality
rights litigation, with its inevitable focus on a narrow legal issue. It is notable,
however, that the economic discourse used by Cullen J. is so well suited to the
task of placing the larger political issues aside. One may also argue that the
business woman and the domestic worker have a common political interest in
any change that attaches greater economic importance to women's work.
However, the language of the Tax Court decision by no means encourages this
connection, with its tight focus on the efficient generation of profit in the paid
economy.
I do not wish to suggest that feminists should reject science out of hand as
a way of knowing and changing the world. A technical rendering of the child
care issue in terms of human capital and productivity does after all capture some
part of some women's experience. 134 What is needed, however, is to revise the
132. Supra note 116 at 5249.
133. A. Macklin, "Foreign Domestic Worker: Surrogate Housewife or Mail Order
Servant?" (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 681. See also Macklin, supra note 15.
134. 1 thank Nancy Staudt for helping me clarify this point.
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concept of science and objectivity to recognize the locatedness and partiality of
all knowledge. Chris Weedon's admonition is useful here:
[Wlhile we need to develop ...a concept of feminist rationality, which is
different from the rationality of patriarchy, and which no longer dismisses
feminine qualities as they are currently defined as irrelevant and inferior, we
cannot afford to abandon reason entirely to the interests of patriarchy. Reason,
like experience, requires both deconstruction and reconstruction in the
interests of feminis[m].135
I have several suggestions as to how this challenge might be taken up in the
fiscal policy field. First, those working for change need to be alert to the
contradictions of technical discourse and the ways it may undermine political
struggles around deficits and taxation even while supporting immediate law
reform struggles. Second, it would be useful, I think, to push the technical
discourses themselves in a more radical direction whenever possible. In Symes,
for example, it might have been possible to draw on the work of feminist
political economists to talk about the productive value of child care labour itself,
and the way women's caregiving work subsidizes profitability in the public
economy. This would be an alternative means of challenging the construction of
women's family responsibilities as private and noneconomic, in a way that
permits a more radical critique of the division of labour and its effects on
different groups of women. In other words, it is worth considering how to
challenge the gender, class and other biases within technical discourses, when
we are deploying them to achieve progressive change in the law. Finally, it is
critical in my view to resist the technocratic ideology of value-neutrality, and to
keep the political and moral issues that are at stake in the foreground of any
analysis. While it may be necessary and worthwhile to counter arguments
justifying the current fiscal system on their own terms, it is equally important to
expose the partiality and contingency of technical renderings of fiscal policy and
to insist on democratic discussion of the political merits.
135. Weedon, supra note 32 at 10.
